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Abstract3
A theory of macroeconomic development based on the novel concept of savings multiplier is developed. Capital4
accumulation changes relative prices, amplifying incentives to save as the economy grows. The savings multiplier hinges5
on two mechanisms. First, accumulation raises wages and leads to redistribution from the consuming old to the saving6
young. Second, higher wages raise the price of old-age care and, in anticipation of this, the young save more. Our theory7
captures important aspects of China’s development and suggests new channels through which the one child policy and8
the dismantling of social benefits have fueled China’s savings rates.9
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1. Introduction1
A theory of macroeconomic development based on the novel concept of savings multiplier is developed:2
capital accumulation sparks output growth but also induces changes in relative prices and in intergenerational3
income shares that create further incentives to accumulate, implying rising saving rates as the economy develops.4
The savings multiplier creates a feedback eﬀect of growth on savings that magniﬁes the impact of exogenous5
shocks – such as demographic change, policy reforms, productivity shocks – on capital per capita in the long6
run. The scope of our results is twofold. First, the savings multiplier introduces circular causality in the7
savings-growth relationship and thus provides a new explanation for rising saving rates in developing countries.8
Second, our theory captures important aspects of China’s economic performance and suggests new channels9
through which the one child policy and the dismantling of cradle-to-grave social beneﬁts have fueled China’s10
savings and accumulation rates. Each point is discussed below.11
Rising saving rates characterized the growth process of most developed economies. Lewis (1954) provides12
an early recognition of this stylized fact, stressing that13
“The central problem in the theory of economic development is to understand the process by which14
a community which was previously saving and investing 4 or 5 per cent of its national income or15
less, converts itself into an economy where voluntary saving is running at about 12 to 15 per cent of16
national income or more. [...] We cannot explain any industrial revolution [...] until we can explain17
why saving increased relatively to national income.” (Lewis, 1954: p.155).18
The issue of causality in the relationship between growth and saving rates is still an open question (see19
Deaton, 2010). Standard growth theories tell us that saving rates drive development but empirical evidence20
suggests that causality may run in the opposite direction (Attanasio et al. 2000; Rodrik, 2000). The topic21
received attention in the growth literature of the late 1990s – mostly dedicated to the stunning performance of22
East Asian economies – but only a few contributions attempted at developing new theories to explain the eﬀects23
of growth on saving rates. One of these contributions is the theory of Relative Consumption, where households’24
utility depends on current consumption relative to a benchmark level which may reﬂect habit formation (Carroll25
et al. 2000), interpersonal comparisons (Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. 2004), or international status seeking (Valente,26
2009). In Relative Consumption models, economic growth raises the benchmark consumption level over time27
and the agents’ willingness to catch-up with the benchmark prompts households to adjust savings accordingly.28
Our theory of the savings multiplier is diﬀerent because the feedback eﬀects of growth on saving rates hinge on29
the economy’s demographic structure, which comprises overlapping generations, and on the allocation of labor30
between diﬀerent production sectors.31
In our model, the ﬁrst channel through which growth aﬀects saving rates is the intergenerational distribution32
eﬀect. Higher savings imply both higher capital stock and increased demand for care by the old, both fueling33
wage increases. The income distribution shifts in favor of the wage earners – that is, accumulation raises the34
income share of savers relative to the old agents – which stimulates further savings and capital accumulation.35
The second channel is the old-age requirement eﬀect. Increased savings and capital accumulation push the1
anticipated future wage up, making old-age care more expensive. To compensate for the increased future costs2
of care, young agents increase their savings relative to current income. This gives an additional channel whereby3
savings and capital accumulation stimulate further savings and capital accumulation. During the transition to4
the long-run equilibrium, savings rates increase over time, the share of employment in the manufacturing sector5
declines, the income distribution shifts in favor of the young, and an increasing share of private expenditures6
is allocated to the purchase of services.17
Although our contribution is theoretical, the key motivation of our analysis lies in the empirical literature8
on Asian economies, and on the experience of China in particular. Since 1978, real per capita GDP in China9
has increased tenfold, and fast output growth was accompanied by massive capital accumulation. After drastic10
policy changes in the late 1970s, savings and investment as a share of GDP increased sharply. Importantly,11
savings and investment rates continued to grow thereafter: graph (a) in Figure 1 shows that more than 40%12
of GDP has been invested, while more than 50% of GDP has been saved, over the last years.13
China’s saving behavior inspired a huge body of empirical literature but there is a lack of new theories that14
could explain the most puzzling fact, namely, that households have increased their savings rate, despite being15
quite poor, having fast income growth, and receiving low returns on their savings.2 In this respect, our model16
provides a theory of savings that is consistent with four relevant facts that characterized China’s development17
– most of which are direct consequences of the reforms enacted in the last forty years.18
First, saving rates increased while fertility sharply declined (Fact 1 ). China’s fertility rate decreased from19
4.9 in 1975 to 1.7 in 2007, while life expectancy increased by ten years in the same period (Litao and Sixin,20
2009). A major trigger of this acceleration in population aging was the one-child policy implemented since21
1978, which changed family composition and reduced the number of births.22
Second, Chinese workers face an increased need to provide for old age with their own resources (Fact 2 ).23
A prominent cause is the reform of the industry sector implemented since the late 1980s, which gradually24
dismantled state owned enterprises and deleted cradle-to-grave social beneﬁts for a huge fraction of workers25
(Ma and Yi, 2010).3 Meanwhile, the private provision of old-age security is neither eﬃcient nor pervasive: less26
than 30% of all employees are covered by pension schemes (Oksanen, 2010).27
Third, a growing share of health care services is, and will increasingly need to be, purchased in the market28
(Fact 3 ). The share of health spending that households pay themselves increased from 16% in 1980 to 61% in29
1This mechanism clearly distinguishes our notion of savings multiplier, which operates on the supply side under full employment
conditions, from the traditional concept of demand multiplier according to which income is pushed up from the side of demand
when factors of production are not fully utilized. To our knowledge, neither the term ‘savings multiplier’ nor its underlying concept
have been previously introduced in the literature.
2The high savings rate reported in graph (a) of Figure 1 reﬂects the sum of high corporate savings and high household
savings. Song et al. (2011) provide a theoretical explanation for high corporate savings based on the existence of capital market
imperfections that generate high shares of ﬁrms’ retained proﬁts. Our claim on the lack of theories refers, instead, to the analysis
of household savings, which is the focus of our model. At present, household savings is the single largest component of total savings
and according to Yang (2012), the increase in the rate of household savings from 2000 to 2008 is the most important contribution
to the overall increase in the Chinese savings rate in the same period.
3The reform implied massive layoﬀs, and the enterprise-based social safety net shrank rapidly as a result (Ma and Yi, 2010).
In the pre-reform system, instead, each state enterprise provided housing, medical care and old-age security to its workers and
pensioners (James 2002).
2001 (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2006), and the growth in China’s health spending is “one of the most rapid in1
world history” (Eggleston, 2012: p.4). The rising importance of private provision may itself be a side-eﬀect of2
the one-child policy through changes in family composition.4 But beyond its causes, the relevant consequence3
for our analysis is that the increased share of care services in private expenditures is driving structural change4
in production sectors. Graph (b) in Figure 1 shows that the share of employment in health and social work5
relative to that in manufacturing has doubled over 15 years.5 Such sectoral change has been neglected as a6
possible determinant of China’s saving rates whereas it plays an important role in our model.7
Fourth, the income distribution is shifting in favor of young wage earners and in disfavor of the old (Fact8
4 ). The share of labor income in GDP has increased (Bai and Qian, 2010) and, since 1998, real wage growth9
has exceeded GDP growth (Li et al., 2012). This induced a shift in the income distribution towards young10
workers (Song and Yang, 2010).11
Our model produces equilibrium dynamics that are fully consistent with Facts 1-4: capital accumulation12
in the manufacturing sector raises wages and shifts labor into the care sector, boosting saving rates via both13
higher income for young cohorts and higher expected future cost of care services. In particular, exogenous14
shocks that plausibly capture the eﬀects of China’s past reforms – namely, a reduction in the population15
growth rate, an increase in the minimum level of care to be purchased – induce higher capital per capita and16
raise saving rates during the transition because capital accumulation is accelerated by the savings multiplier. A17
calibration exercise shows that, despite the small relative size of China’s care sector, the accumulation eﬀects of18
the savings multiplier account for 34% of the capital stock per worker in the steady state. These results suggest19
that the one-child policy and the dismantling of cradle-to-grave social beneﬁts have fueled China’s saving rates20
and capital accumulation in the last decades. By the same token, the counteracting reforms that China’s21
government recently announced – namely, the abandonment of the one-child policy as well as the intention22
to expand the welfare system – are predicted to reduce savings and capital accumulation. In this respect,23
the calibrated model quantiﬁes the impact of exogenous fertility shocks and shows that a reform introducing24
coverage of basic care would reduce capital per worker by more than 20%.25
With respect to the existing literature, a speciﬁc value added of our analysis is the use of the general26
equilibrium framework. In our model, the economy’s equilibrium path brings together Facts 1-4 and combines27
them with a precise causal order. The existing empirical literature – e.g., Kraay (2000), Modigliani and Cao28
(2004), Chamon and Prasad (2010) – provides very valuable information on each of these facts but typically29
focusing on one single mechanism in isolation from the others, thus failing to deliver a complete picture.6 Our30
paper is diﬀerent, but complementary, to this line of research: none of the above mentioned contributions31
4The one-child policy drastically reduced the scope for family provided care during a period in which the need for such care
was rapidly increasing. More and more families now consist of four grandparents, two parents and one child, making the market
provision of care a necessity.
5From 1993 to 2008, the employment share of manufacturing decreased from 37% to 29% while the employment share of health
and social work increased from 2.8% to 4.7% (ILO, 2015).
6Kraay (2000) documents the link between the increased need to provide for old age and the dismantling of state-owned
enterprises; Modigliani and Cao (2004) ﬁnd a strong eﬀect of the one-child policy on the needs to save for retirement; Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2006) and Chamon and Prasad (2010) explain increased saving rates with the rising burden of expenditures such as
health care and education; Song and Yang (2010) argue that the main reason for the rising saving rate is the shift in the income
distribution in favor of young workers.
develops a general equilibrium model where capital accumulation aﬀects subsequent saving rates, or note any1
of the two mechanisms behind the savings multiplier.2
2. The Model3
The key features of the model are the overlapping-generations (OLG) structure, the hypothesis of age-4
dependent needs, and the existence of two production sectors. The ﬁrst set of ﬁrms produces the generic good5
which is partly saved as physical capital, and partly consumed by both young and old agents. The second set6
of ﬁrms provides services that are exclusively purchased by the old and may be interpreted as old-age care.7
The one-good OLG framework pioneered by Diamond (1965) – henceforth termed the canonical model – may8
be viewed as a special case of our model.79
2.1. Consumers10
Each agent lives two periods (t, t + 1). Total population, denoted Nt, consists of N
y
t young and N
o
t old11
agents, and grows at the exogenous net rate n > −1;12
Nt = N
y
t +N
o
t , N
y
t = N
o
t · (1 + n) , Nt+1 = Nt · (1 + n) . (1)13
Agents purchase two types of goods over their life-cycle: the generic consumption good is enjoyed in both14
periods of life whereas old-age care services are only purchased in the second period of life. The lifetime utility15
of an agent born at the beginning of period t is16
Ut ≡ u (ct) + β · v
(
dt+1, ht+1 − h¯
)
, (2)17
where ct and dt+1 represent consumption levels of the generic good in the ﬁrst and second period of life,18
respectively, ht+1 is the amount of old-age care consumed when old, h¯  0 is the minimum requirement – i.e.,19
the minimum amount of old-age care required by old agents – and β ∈ (0, 1) is the private discount factor20
between young and old age. The consumer problem is subject to the constraint that the minimum requirement,21
ht+1− h¯  0, is at least weakly satisﬁed.8 The case with zero minimum requirement, h¯ = 0, is of special interest22
since it will allow us to separate the two central mechanisms of the model, the ‘intergenerational distribution’23
and the ‘old-age requirement’ eﬀects (cf. Section 4.).24
Young agents supply inelastically one unit of homogeneous labor and save part of their labor income. Old25
agents do not work and spend all their interest income in purchasing consumption goods and old-age care. The26
individual budget constraints read27
ct = wt − st, (3)
stRt+1 = dt+1 + pt+1ht+1, (4)
7Detailed derivations and long proofs are collected in the separate online appendix.
8As is standard, the focus will be on interior equilibria where ht+1 > h¯ and veriﬁcation of ex-post the conditions under which
this strict inequality holds. The analysis shows that there always exists a unique equilibrium in which the allocation of labor
between generic-good and health-care production is consistent with the interior solution ht+1 > h¯.
where the generic good is taken as the numeraire, wt is the wage rate, st is savings, Rt+1 is the gross rate of1
return to saving, and pt+1 is the price of old-age care. Savings consist of physical capital, which is homogeneous2
with the generic good. Assuming full depreciation within one period, market clearing requires that aggregate3
capital at the beginning of period t + 1 equals aggregate savings of the young agents in the previous period,4
Kt+1 = N
y
t st.5
In order to make the analysis transparent, consider a speciﬁc form of preferences:6
u (ct) ≡ log ct, (5)
v
(
dt+1, ht+1 − h¯
) ≡ log [γ (dt+1)σ−1σ + (1− γ) (ht+1 − h¯)σ−1σ ]
σ
σ−1
, (6)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a weighting parameter and σ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between consumption7
goods and care services in the second period of life: dt+1 and ht+1 are strict complements if σ < 1, strict8
substitutes if σ > 1. In the limiting case σ → 1, the term in square brackets reduces to the Cobb-Douglas9
form (dt+1)
γ
(ht+1)
1−γ
. The empirical literature shows that, when h is interpreted as health care, the most10
plausible case is that of strict complementarity with a positive requirement, σ < 1 and h¯ > 0.9 The case of11
substitutability is nonetheless also studied. Preferences (5)-(6) exhibit two essential properties. First, they12
allow us to treat the canonical OLG model as a special case: setting γ = 1 and h¯ = 0, old-age care services do13
not yield utility and, hence, are not produced in equilibrium. Second, the utility functions (5)-(6) exhibit a unit14
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Therefore, setting γ = 1 yields the log-linear version of the canonical15
model in which the saving rate is constant over time. This implies that, in the general case 0 < γ < 1, any16
departure from the canonical result of ‘constant saving rate’ must be induced by our distinctive hypothesis,17
namely, the fact that old agents need dedicated care services.18
2.2. Production Sectors19
From a technological viewpoint, the diﬀerent nature of generic goods – which may be interpreted as man-20
ufactured products – and old-age care services – which include health care as well as personal assistance – is21
captured by Baumol’s (1967) hypothesis: the production of care services is strongly labor intensive because,22
diﬀerently from what happens in manufacturing industries, capital cannot be used as a substitute for labor.23
Hartwig (2008) tests this hypothesis on recent data, obtaining strong empirical support to Baumol’s view and24
showing that health care expenditure is mainly driven by wage increases. Our model captures these aspects25
by assuming that care services are produced with labor as the only factor of production. The consumption26
good, instead, is produced by means of capital and labor as in Diamond’s (1965) canonical model.10 The27
fraction of workers employed in the generic sector is denoted t while 1 − t denotes the fraction employed in28
the care sector. Perfect labor mobility and perfectly competitive conditions in the labor market ensure wage29
9When h¯ > 0, function (6) implies that the income elasticity of old-age care falls short of unity, in line with Acemoglu et al.
(2013) that estimate the income elasticity of health spending to 0.7. Finkelstein et al. (2012) estimate an elasticity of substitution
between health and non-health consumption equal to σ = 0.2.
10For a two-sector OLG model with capital in both sectors, as well as the existence and stability properties of such models, see
Galor (1992).
equalization in equilibrium. The old-age care sector exhibits a simple constant returns to scale technology,1
Ht ≡ η · (1− t) ·Nyt , (7)2
where Ht is the aggregate output of care services, and η > 0 is a constant labor productivity parameter. In3
the generic good sector, aggregate sectoral output Xt is given by4
Xt = B · (Kt)α (tNyt )1−α (8)5
where B > 0 is an exogenous productivity parameter, Kt is aggregate capital, and α ∈ (0, 1) is an elasticity6
parameter.7
3. Static Equilibrium8
This section discusses the static equilibrium conditions holding in each period for a given stock of capital9
per worker. The proﬁt-maximizing conditions for ﬁrms and the utility-maximizing conditions for households10
determine the joint static equilibrium of the labor and goods markets, and bear precise implications for the11
saving rate and for the co-movements of employment and capital.12
3.1. Firms13
In the service sector, technology (7) implies that the wage is proportional to the market price of care14
services,15
wt = ηpt. (9)16
Market clearing requires that total output of old-age care services matches aggregate demand by old agents,17
Ht = N
o
t ht. The existence of a minimum requirement, ht  h¯, implies that total production Ht must exceed18
Not h¯. This imposes an upper bound on the employment share of the generic sector: given technology (7), an19
interior equilibrium requires20
t 
η (1 + n)− h¯
η (1 + n)
≡ max, (10)21
where max is the maximum level of employment in the generic sector that is compatible with a level of old-age22
care output equal to the minimum requirement.11 In the remainder of the analysis, the restriction h¯  η (1 + n)23
is assumed to hold, which implies max  0. When the minimum requirement is h¯ = 0, it follows that max = 1.24
In the generic good sector, factor prices equal marginal productivities,25
wt = B (1− α) (κt/t)α = (1− α) (xt/t) , (11)
Rt = Bα (t/κt)
1−α = α (xt/κt) , (12)
where xt ≡ Xt/Nyt is sectoral output per young. Aggregating incomes between sectors yields26
Yt
Nyt
= wt +Rtκt = xt
(
1− α
t
+ α
)
, (13)27
11The level of care supply equal to the minimum requirement is Hmint ≡ η (1− max)Nyt = Not h¯.
where Yt is aggregate income, which coincides with the total value of goods and services produced in the1
economy, Yt ≡ Xt + ptHt.2
3.2. Consumers3
Each agent maximizes (2) subject to the budget constraints (3)-(4). Using the standard notation for4
derivatives – i.e., uct ≡ ∂u/∂ct – the solution to the consumer problem yields two familiar ﬁrst order conditions:5
the Keynes-Ramsey rule, uct = βRt+1vdt+1 , and an eﬃciency condition establishing the equality between the6
price of care services and the marginal rate of substitution with second-period generic goods consumption,7
vht+1/vdt+1 = pt+1. Under preferences (5)-(6), these conditions determine the following relationships (see8
online appendix). Consumption and savings of young agents are given by9
ct =
1
1 + β
(
wt − pt+1
Rt+1
h¯
)
and st =
1
1 + β
(
βwt +
pt+1
Rt+1
h¯
)
. (14)10
When h¯ = 0, these expressions are similar to those holding in the canonical model, where young agents save11
a constant fraction of their wage income. This similarity does not imply, however, the same accumulation12
dynamics: as shown in section 3.7. below, our model predicts that, even with h¯ = 0, the aggregate saving rate13
is not constant because the intergenerational distribution of income changes over time. In the more general14
case with h¯ > 0, consumption and savings are not ﬁxed proportions of labor income: in the ﬁrst period of15
life, consumption is lower and savings are higher the larger is h¯. The reason is that young agents take into16
account the future cost of the minimum care to be purchased in the second period of life. The magnitude of17
this eﬀect on savings depends on the future price of care in present-value terms, pt+1/Rt+1, which is in turn18
determined by the future wage since pt+1/Rt+1 = ηwt+1/Rt+1. This mechanism, henceforth labeled the old-19
age requirement eﬀect, establishes a precise channel through which relative factor prices aﬀect present savings:20
high future wages wt+1 and low returns on savings Rt+1 induce higher savings today in order to purchase the21
minimum amount of care tomorrow.22
Considering generic consumption in the second period of life, each old agent purchases23
dt = (1 + n) [t − (1− α)]B (κt/t)α , (15)24
which is the residual (per-old) output of the generic sector after consumption and savings of young agents have25
been subtracted. Result (15) implies that second-period consumption is positive only if t > 1 − α, which is26
always the case in equilibrium, as shown below.27
The last condition for utility maximization links the old agents’ expenditure shares over the two goods to28
their relative price:29
pt ·
(
ht − h¯
)
dt
=
(
1− γ
γ
)σ
p1−σt . (16)30
Expression (16) shows that the expenditure share of net care services increases (decreases) with the price when31
the two goods are complements (substitutes). The reason is that the eﬀect of a ceteris paribus increase in32
pt on the expenditure ratio pt
(
ht − h¯
)
/dt depends on the elasticity of the relative demand for care services.33
Under complementarity, demand is relatively rigid and the increase in pt raises the expenditure share of net1
care. Under substitutability, instead, demand is elastic and the opposite happens. These substitution eﬀects2
bear crucial consequences for the allocation of labor, as shown below.123
3.3. Labor Market4
The labor demand schedules of the two production sectors determine a unique equilibrium in the labor5
market. From (9) and (11), wage equalization between sectors implies6
pt = (B/η) (1− α) (κt/t)α ≡ Φ (t, κt) . (17)7
Condition (17) deﬁnes pt as the level of the price of care ensuring wage equalization for given levels of sectoral8
employment, capital per worker, and productivity. In particular, function pt = Φ(t, κt) is strictly decreasing9
in t. The intuition is that for a given capital per young κt, higher employment in the generic sector decreases10
the marginal productivity of labor, implying a lower wage, and thus a lower price of care.11
3.4. Goods Markets12
The equilibrium in the goods market is characterized by solving the demand relationship (16) for the price13
of care, and substituting ptht/dt with the market-clearing and zero-proﬁt conditions holding for the producing14
ﬁrms, obtaining (see online appendix)15
pt =
(
1− γ
γ
) σ
σ−1
[
(1− α) (max − t)
t − (1− α)
] 1
1−σ
≡ Ψ(t) . (18)16
Expression (18) deﬁnes pt as the price of care that ensures equilibrium in the goods market.
13 The most17
important insight is that the function pt = Ψ(t) is strictly decreasing when σ < 1, and strictly increasing18
when σ > 1. When σ < 1 the price of care is positively related to the employment share in the care sector19
1 − t. The reason is that a ceteris paribus increase in pt increases the expenditure share that old consumers20
devote to care services, attracting labor in the care sector. When σ > 1, in contrast, a higher price of care21
induces a lower expenditure share of care, and thus more labor in the generic sector.1422
3.5. Employment and Capital Co-Movements23
Consider now the joint equilibrium of the markets for labor and for goods. The two relevant conditions,24
(17) and (18), imply that the price of care and sectoral employment levels in each period t depend on current25
capital per worker, κt. Formally, the employment share of the generic sector for a given level of κt, denoted by26
t =  (κt), is the ﬁxed point27
 (κt) ≡ arg solve{t∈(1−α,max)} [Φ (t, κt) = Ψ (t)] . (19)28
12Substitution eﬀects only disappear with Cobb-Douglas preferences: when σ = 1, relative expenditure shares are exclusively
determined by the taste parameter γ and do not depend on the relative price pt.
13Function Ψ (t) does not depend on capital per worker because, with Cobb-Douglas technologies, the sector allocation of labor
alone determines the sectoral output ratio Xt/ptHt.
14It should be noted that, in the special case of unit elasticity of substitution, σ = 1, expression (18) does not hold because
price and quantity eﬀects on the demand side balance each other. As a result, the equilibrium between demand and supply in the
goods market is characterized by constant employment shares, with t =
(1−α)(γmax+1−γ)
γ(1−α)+1−γ at each t.
The existence and uniqueness of this ﬁxed point can be veriﬁed in graphical terms in Figure 2 (see the online1
appendix for a formal proof). On the one hand, the function Φ (t, κt) is strictly decreasing in t and exhibits2
positive vertical intercepts at the boundaries of the relevant interval t ∈ (1− α, max). On the other hand,3
the function Ψ (t) is decreasing (increasing) under complementarity (substitutability), and display asymptotic4
properties that ensure the existence and uniqueness of the ﬁxed point Ψ (t) = Φ (t, κt) within the relevant5
interval  ∈ (1− α, max).15 The ﬁxed point (19) simultaneously determines employment shares and the price6
of care. Substituting  (κt) in Ψ (t) or in Φ (t, κt) the equilibrium price of care for given capital per worker7
follows as8
p (κt) ≡ Ψ( (κt)) = Φ ( (κt) , κt) . (20)9
Even though it is not yet speciﬁed whether and how capital grows, result (20) clariﬁes how capital accumulation10
aﬀects the price of care and employment shares:11
Proposition 1 An equilibrium trajectory with positive accumulation implies a rising price of care. Under com-
plementarity, the employment share in the generic sector is decreasing. Under substitutability, the employment
share in the generic sector is increasing;
κt+1 > κt =⇒ pt+1 > pt
and
κt+1 > κt ⇒
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
t+1 < t if σ < 1
t+1 > t if σ > 1
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
Proof. The proposition can be proved in graphical terms.16 Since ∂Φ (, κ) /∂κ > 0, an increase in κ shifts
the Φ (, κ) curve up-rightward in Figure 2. The resulting equilibrium price p (κ) is necessarily higher but  (κ)
reacts diﬀerently depending on the value of σ. The employment share  (κ) increases under complementarity,
decreases under substitutability:
′κ ≡
d (κt)
dκt
< 0 if σ < 1; > 0 if σ > 1 .
12
The intuition is that an increase in capital per young increases the equilibrium wage and thereby the price13
of care. Under complementarity, old agents react to the price increase by raising the share of expenditure on14
net care, which decreases the employment share in the generic sector  (κ). Under substitutability, instead, old15
agents reduce the expenditure share on net care and employment in the generic sector rises.16
15See the online appendix for further details.
16Proposition 1 is equivalently proved by diﬀerentiating the equilibrium condition Ψ ( (κt)) = Φ ( (κt) , κt). The exact relation-
ship between κ and  is reported in expression (30) below, and indeed implies that ′κ ≡d (κt) /dκt is strictly negative (positive)
under complementarity (substitutability).
3.6. Static Equilibrium Comparative Statics1
For a given capital stock, the static equilibrium labor allocation depends on the parameters of the model.2
The following Proposition establishes how the employment share of the generic sector, denoted by  (κt) =3

(
κt;B, n, h¯
)
, depends on productivity B, on population growth n, and on the level of the minimum requirement4
h¯.5
Proposition 2 In the static equilibrium with given κt,6
d
(
κt;B, n, h¯
)
dB
≡ ′B < 0 if σ < 1; > 0 if σ > 1 , (21)
d
(
κt;B, n, h¯
)
dh¯
≡ ′¯h < 0, (22)
d
(
κt;B, n, h¯
)
dn
≡ ′n > 0 if h¯ > 0 ( = 0 if h¯ = 0). (23)
Proof. The proposition may be proved in graphical terms. An increase in B shifts Φ (, κ) upward in Figure7
2. The employment share  increases when σ < 1, and decreases when σ > 1. Changes in n and in h¯ operate8
through max in the expression for Ψ () in equation (18). An increase in max shifts Ψ () to the right, increasing9
. Provided h¯ > 0, A higher n and a lower h¯ both imply a higher max ≡ 1− h¯η(1+n) .10
A higher B expands production possibilities in the generic sector and aﬀects the labor allocation depending11
on the value of σ. Under complementarity, consumers wish to exploit the productivity gain to purchase more12
care, and such higher demand pushes labor into the care sector. Under substitutability, instead, labor is drawn13
into the generic sector as old agents increase their relative demand for consumption goods. The eﬀects of14
changes in max are more clear-cut: when a larger fraction of workers is needed to satisfy the minimum care15
requirement, the care sector will employ more workers.16
3.7. Saving Rates and Accumulation17
The general relationships linking savings rates, capital accumulation, and sectoral employment shares can18
be summarized as follows. Considering the economy’s aggregate income (13) and the wage rate (11), the labor19
share accruing to young agents is20
wtN
y
t
Yt
=
(1− α) xtt
xt
(
1−α
t
+ α
) = 1− α
1− α (1− t) , (24)21
Equation (24) shows that, in static equilibrium, an increase in the generic sector employment share t reduces22
the total income share of young agents. The intuition is that if labor moves from the care sector to generic23
production, the return to capital increases relative to the wage rate, and this implies a shift in the income24
distribution away from the young towards the old. This result is referred to as the intergenerational distribution25
eﬀect.26
Since only young agents save, the intergenerational distribution directly inﬂuences the economy’s saving27
rate and, hence, capital accumulation. The savings rate is denoted by θt and is deﬁned as aggregate savings28
relative to the total value of production. Combining the saving function in (14) with expression (24), and1
substituting max by (10), yields2
θt ≡ N
y
t st
Yt
=
β (1− α)
1 + β︸ ︷︷ ︸
Canonical model
· 1
1− α · (1− t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intergenerational Distribution
· Γ
(
h¯
t+1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,
Old-age Requirement
(25)3
where4
Γ
(
h¯
t+1
)
≡
[
1− (1− α)
α (1 + β) η(1 + n)
h¯
t+1
]−1
, Γ′ (·) > 0, Γ (0) = 1. (26)5
Expression (25) shows that the savings rate is negatively related to both t and t+1. The current employ-6
ment share of the generic sector, t, aﬀects the saving rate through the intergenerational distribution channel7
described above. The anticipated future employment share, t+1, aﬀects the saving rate through the function8
Γ (·), which captures the old-age requirement eﬀect – i.e., extra savings induced by the existence of a minimum9
care requirement: being increasing in h¯, the term Γ (·) equals unity when h¯ = 0 and strictly exceeds unity when10
h¯ > 0.17 The comparison with the canonical model is straightforward. Without the care sector, the last two11
terms in (25) reduce to unity, and the saving rate equals the fraction of income saved by the young, β/(1+ β),12
times the income share of the young, 1− α.13
Our preliminary conclusion is twofold. First, both the intergenerational distribution and the old-age re-14
quirement eﬀects push the saving rate above the level predicted by the canonical model. Second, the saving15
rate is, in general, not constant over time and in particular, it will be increasing over time if the economy16
follows an equilibrium path along which the employment share of the generic sector t grows over time.17
4. Dynamic General Equilibrium18
Since the generic consumption good is produced by means of a neoclassical technology, the dynamic equilib-19
rium path of the economy admits a long-run steady state in which capital per worker is constant, and generic20
production grows at the exogenous rate of population growth. This section derives the stability properties21
of the long-run steady state and shows that the transitional dynamics arising under complementarity match22
qualitatively the stylized facts that inspire our analysis (cf. Introduction). In the long run, the intergenera-23
tional distribution and the old-age requirement eﬀects aﬀect, through distinct channels, the steady-state level24
of capital per worker which is thus higher than in the canonical model.25
4.1. Accumulation Law26
The equality between investment and savings implies that capital per worker is determined by previous27
savings according to28
κt+1 =
θtYt
1 + n
. (27)29
17The online appendix shows that the static equilibrium conditions imply (1− α) h¯ < α (1 + β) η(1 + n)t+1, from which it
follows that Γ
(
h¯/t+1
)
> 1 for any h¯ > 0.
This market clearing condition, combined with the saving decisions of young agents, yields the dynamic law1
that governs capital accumulation in the economy: by substituting (25) and (13) in the right hand side of (27),2
the accumulation law reads3
κt+1 =
Bβ (1− α)
(1 + β) (1 + n)
καt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Canonical model
· −αt︸︷︷︸
Intergen. Distr.
· Γ
(
h¯
t+1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
.
Old-age requirement eﬀect
(28)4
Expression (28) decomposes the accumulation law of capital per worker in three parts. The ﬁrst term on the5
right hand side is the dynamic law in the canonical one-good model. The second and third terms on the right6
hand side of (28) directly follow from the intergenerational distribution eﬀect and the old-age requirement7
eﬀect. An increase in t reduces κt+1 because a lower current wage reduces young agents’ income, and thereby,8
current savings. An increase in t+1 reduces κt+1 because a lower future wage reduces the expected future cost9
of health care, and thereby, current savings.10
The presence of anticipated future variables in the right hand side of (28) implies that further work is needed11
to characterize the equilibrium path. Recalling result (19), equilibrium employment shares are a function of12
the capital stock per worker in each period. By substituting t =  (κt) and t+1 =  (κt+1) into (28), the13
accumulation law follows as14
κt+1 =
Bβ (1− α)
(1 + β) (1 + n)
καt [ (κt)]
−α
Γ
(
h¯
 (κt+1)
)
. (29)15
Expression (29) implies that capital dynamics crucially depend on how sectoral employment shares react to16
variations in capital per worker. In this respect, the relevant elasticity is1817
′κ (κt)κt
 (κt)
=
1
1− 11−σ 1αQ1
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
< 0 if σ < 1
> 0 if σ > 1
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ , (30)18
where Q1 ≡ tt−(1−α) ·
max−(1−α)
max−t > 1. The slope of the accumulation law can be found by taking the elasticity19
of (29) with respect to κt and κt+1, which yields
19
20
dκt+1
dκt
κt
κt+1
=
α− α ′κ(κt)κt(κt)
1 + Γ
′
Γ
h¯
(κt+1)
′κ(κt+1)κt+1
(κt+1)
. (31)21
In the numerator of (31), the direct eﬀect on κt+1 of an increase in κt is larger under complementarity, i.e.,22
when ′κ (κt) < 0. When h¯ > 0, there is also an indirect eﬀect via the increase in  (κt+1), captured in the23
denominator. The possibility of (local) instability and multiple steady states, however, turns out to be remote:24
non-uniqueness and instability might only occur under unreasonable parameter values (see online appendix).25
Armed with these results, the equilibrium path of the economy can be fully characterized. The following26
subsections show that the intergenerational distribution and the old-age requirement eﬀects raise the long-27
run capital stock above the canonical level through distinct channels. In order to obtain transparent results,28
18Expression (30) is obtained by diﬀerentiating the equilibrium condition Ψ ( (κt)) = Φ ( (κt) , κt) and is fully derived in the
online appendix. The fact that Q1 > 1 directly follows from the requirement 1− α < t < max and it implies the signs reported
in (30). Note that (30) yields an alternative proof of Proposition 1.
19Totally diﬀerentiating (29) yields
dκt+1
κt+1
= α dκt
κt
−α∂(κt)
∂κt
1
(κt)
dκt − Γ′Γ h¯t+1
∂(κt+1)
∂κt+1
1
(κt+1)
dκt+1, which can be rearranged
to obtain (31).
subsection 4.2. investigates the case without minimum care requirement, h¯ = 0. Subsection 4.3. extends the1
analysis to the more general case with h¯ > 0.2
4.2. Dynamics without Minimum Requirement3
When there is no minimum care requirement for old agents, capital accumulation obeys a fairly simple4
dynamic law. This subsection assumes for simplicity that the elasticity of capital in generic production is not5
too high:6
Assumption 1: α < 34 .7
This assumption is suﬃcient but not necessary for the steady state to be unique.20 The next Proposi-8
tion establishes that the steady state is globally stable under both complementarity and substitutability: the9
economy converges towards a long-run equilibrium in which capital per worker, the price of health care and10
employment shares are constant.11
Proposition 3 In the neoclassical case with h¯ = 0, capital per worker obeys12
κt+1 =
βη
(1 + n) (1 + β)
p (κt) , (32)13
where p (κt) is the price of health care determined by (20). Under Assumption 1 the steady state κss =
βη
(1+n)(1+β)p (κss) is unique and globally stable:
lim
t→∞κt = κss, limt→∞ t =  (κss) , limt→∞ pt = p (κss) .
During the transition, given a positive initial stock κ0 < κss, both capital per worker and the price of health14
care increase; under complementarity (substitutability), employment in the generic sector declines (increases)15
and the saving rate increases (declines):16
κt+1 > κt, pt+1 > pt,
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
t+1 < t and θt+1 > θt if σ < 1
t+1 > t and θt+1 < θt if σ > 1
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ . (33)17
Proof. Expression (32) follows from setting h¯ = 0 in (29) and substituting (17) and (20). Result (33) follows
from Proposition 1 combined with (25) that establishes θt be decreasing in t. For κss to be stable and unique,
the elasticity (31) evaluated in κss must be less than unity. Inserting κt = κt+1 = κss and Γ = 1 and Γ
′ = 0
in (31), the elasticity reduces to
dκt+1
dκt
= α− α
′
κ (κss)κss
 (κss)
,
where the right hand side is less than unity if and only if m1 < 1, where18
m1 (κss) ≡ − 
′
κ (κss) κss
 (κss)
α
1− α (34)19
In the online appendix it is shown that Assumption 1 is a suﬃcient condition for m1 < 1 .20
20In the online appendix, part B, the model is solved for the case where Assumption 1 is not satisﬁed. Moreover, under
substitutability, the steady state is unique and stable independently of the parameter values.
Proposition 3 suggests three remarks. First, the dynamic law (32) shows that, with no minimum care1
requirement, investment per young is proportional to the price of care. The reason is that, when h¯ = 0, savings2
only depend on current wages. Second, given that capital per worker grows monotonically, both the wage3
and the price of care increase over time. Employment shares, however, move in opposite directions depending4
on the value of σ, which determines whether the expenditure share of care services increases or decreases in5
response to increasing prices. The third remark is that, under complementarity, the savings rate θt increases6
during the transition because rising care prices attract labor in the care sector and the income share of young7
agents then grows – i.e., the intergenerational distribution eﬀect.8
The long-run consequences of the intergenerational distribution eﬀect become evident by comparing the9
steady-state level of the capital stock, κss, with that arising in the canonical model, denoted by κ
canonical
ss .10
From (28), imposing h¯ = 0 and κt+1 = κt = κss yields11
κss =
1
 (κss)
α
1−α
[
Bβ (1− α)
(1 + β) (1 + n)
] 1
1−α
= κcanonicalss ·
1
 (κss)
α
1−α
, (35)12
where κcanonicalss is obtained by setting t = 1 in each period, and equals13
κcanonicalss =
[
Bβ (1− α)
(1 + β) (1 + n)
] 1
1−α
. (36)14
It follows from (35) that κss > κ
canonical
ss always holds as long as  (κss) < 1. Therefore, capital per worker in15
the long run is higher than in the canonical model independently of whether generic goods and care services16
are complements or substitutes: for any value of σ, the need for care services increases the demand for labor,17
pushing up the income share of young cohorts and thereby the saving rate.18
4.3. Dynamics with Minimum Care Requirement19
When the minimum old-age care requirement is strictly positive, h¯ > 0, the accumulation law (28) includes20
the dependency of current savings on future employment shares, i.e. the old-age requirement eﬀect. This21
dynamic law determines the steady state of the system and the associated stability properties. Under substi-22
tutability, σ > 1, there always exists a unique steady state. The case of complementarity, σ < 1, can be studied23
more easily by assuming, again, that the production elasticity of capital is not too high:24
Assumption 2: α < 1−α1−σ .25
This assumption is suﬃcient but not necessary for the steady state to be unique.2126
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 2, equation (29) exhibits a unique steady state κ¯ss that is globally stable.27
The transitional dynamics of p (κt) and  (κt) comply with Proposition 1.28
Proof. For κ¯ss to be stable and unique, the elasticity (31) evaluated in κ¯ss must be less than unity. Inserting
κt = κt+1 = κ¯ss in (31), the elasticity reduces to
dκt+1
dκt
=
α− α ′κ(κ¯ss)κ¯ss(κ¯ss)
1 + Γ
′
Γ
h¯
(κ¯ss)
′κ(κ¯ss)κ¯ss
(κ¯ss)
,
21In the online appendix, part B, the model is soved for the case where Assumption 2 is not satisﬁed.
where the right hand side is less than unity if and only if1
m1 (κ¯ss) +m2 (κ¯ss) < 1, (37)2
with3
m2 (κ¯ss) ≡ − 
′
κ (κ¯ss) κ¯ss
 (κ¯ss)
Γ′
Γ
h¯
 (κ¯ss)
1
1− α
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
< 1 if σ < 1
< 0 if σ > 1
. (38)4
In the online appendix Assumption 2 is shown to be a suﬃcient condition for (37) to be satisﬁed.5
Proposition 4 establishes that, even in the general case with positive minimum care requirement, h¯ > 0,6
complementarity is associated with increasing savings rates during the transition. This is the combined result7
of the old-age requirement and intergenerational distribution eﬀects. By imposing κt+1 = κt = κ¯ss in (28), the8
steady-state level of capital per worker equals9
κ¯ss = κ
canonical
ss ·
1
 (κ¯ss)
α
1−α
· Γ
(
h¯
 (κ¯ss)
) 1
1−α
. (39)10
Since Γ (·) strictly exceeds one when h¯ > 0, result (39) establishes that κ¯ss > κss > κcanonicalss . That is, the11
long-run level of capital per worker is higher when there is a positive minimum requirement of old-age care,12
which prompts young agents to save more during the transition in response to the continuous increase of the13
price of care services. Expression (39) will be exploited in the quantitative analysis of section 6. to calculate14
the impact of exogenous shocks on capital per worker in a calibrated version of our model.15
Our main remark is that, under complementarity, σ < 1, the transitional dynamics of our model capture16
very well the stylized facts that inspired the analysis. During the transition to the steady state, the saving rate17
grows, the price of care services and the wage rate increase over time, the income distribution shifts in favor18
of young workers, and the employment share of the generic sector declines. Several developing countries, and19
in particular, China in the last two decades, experienced the same qualitative dynamics as documented in the20
Introduction. Since the hypothesis σ < 1 is also empirically plausible (Finkelstein et al. 2012), the remainder21
of the analysis will focus on the case of complementarity.22
5. Savings Multipliers23
This section introduces the concept of savings multiplier (subsection 5.1.) and describes its use in the24
analysis of three types of exogenous shocks: increased productivity (subsect. 5.2.), reduced fertility (subsect.25
5.3.) and increased minimum care requirement (subsect. 5.4.). The nature of these shocks may be conceptually26
linked to the eﬀects of past reforms in China, in particular, the one-child policy and the dismantling of social27
beneﬁts.28
5.1. Conceptual Deﬁnition29
The intergenerational distribution and the old-age requirement eﬀects create feedback mechanisms whereby30
capital accumulation stimulates further savings and, hence, further accumulation. These feedback eﬀects bear31
major consequences for the economy’s response to exogenous shocks: following a change in the value of a1
parameter, the resulting change in the long-run level of capital per worker must include the cumulative impact2
of all the feedback eﬀects that operate during the transition to the new steady state. Therefore, in our model3
with complementarity, the long-run eﬀects of exogenous shocks are always ampliﬁed by a ‘savings multiplier’,4
which measures the impact of the feedback eﬀects that raise savings during the transition.5
5.2. Productivity Shocks6
It is henceforth assumed σ < 1 for the reasons explained in the previous section.22 Consider a productivity7
shock taking the form of an exogenous increase in B. In the canonical model, this shock would increase the8
long-run level of (log) capital per worker in (36) by9
d log κcanonicalss
dB
=
1
B (1− α) . (40)10
In our model, the impact of the shock is magniﬁed by both the intergenerational distribution and the old-age11
requirement eﬀects. To preserve expositional clarity, ﬁrst consider the case with zero minimum requirement.12
Zero minimum requirement. With h¯ = 0, the steady-state capital per worker is κss deﬁned in (35), and the13
impact of the productivity shock is determined by14
d log κss
dB
=
1
1−m1 (κss)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Savings Multiplier
(
d log κcanonicalss
dB
+m1 (κss)
′B (κss)
′κ (κss) · κss
)
, (41)15
The crucial element in (41) is the savings multiplier, where m1 is already deﬁned in (34). Under comple-16
mentarity, m1 is strictly positive, and is less than unity in view of the stability of the steady state.
23 Since17
0 < m1 < 1, the savings multiplier in (41) is strictly higher than unity. Combining this result with 
′
κ < 0 and18
′B < 0,
24 it follows that the impact of a productivity shock on steady-state capital per worker is stronger than19
that predicted by the canonical model. There are two reasons for this, both related to the intergenerational20
distribution eﬀect. First, the productivity increase modiﬁes the static equilibrium of the labor market: workers21
move out of generic production and into the care sector, increasing the wage further relative to the canonical22
model. This ‘static reallocation eﬀect’, represented by the term m1
′
B/ (
′
κκ) > 0, increases ﬁrms’ demand23
for capital and current savings. Second, as the capital stock starts to grow, further labor is pushed out of24
generic production and into care, increasing the wage even further and thus magnifying the initial increase25
in savings: the cumulative impact of such ‘dynamic feedback eﬀects’ is represented by the savings multiplier,26
1/ (1−m1). The combination of these static and dynamic reallocation eﬀects thus yields a larger overall impact27
of productivity shocks than in the canonical model.28
22All the equations that follow are identical under substitutability, the only diﬀerence being in the strength of the eﬀects:
the saving multipliers exceed unity when σ < 1 and fall short of unity when σ > 1. Hence, shocks that are magniﬁed with
complementarity are instead dampened with substitutability.
23Under complementarity, m1 is positive because ′κ < 0 – see expression (30) – and is strictly less than unity in view of the
stability condition proven in Proposition 3. Under substitutability, instead, expression (30) implies ′κ > 0 and therefore m1 < 0.
24Under complementarity, ′κ < 0 follows from (30) whereas ′B < 0 is established in Proposition 2.
Positive minimum requirement. With h¯ > 0, the savings multiplier is modiﬁed by the old-age requirement1
eﬀect. From (39), the eﬀect of increased productivity on long-run capital is now given by2
d log κ¯ss
dB
=
1
1−m1 (κ¯ss)−m2 (κ¯ss)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Savings multiplier
[
d log κcanonicalss
dB
+
(m1 (κ¯ss) +m2 (κ¯ss)) 
′
B (κ¯ss)
′κ (κ¯ss) κ¯ss
]
, (42)3
where m2 is deﬁned in (38). Under complementarity, the term m1 +m2 is strictly positive, and is less than4
unity in view of the stability of the steady state.25 Since 0 < m1+m2 < 1, the savings multiplier in (42) exceeds5
unity. Compared to the case with zero requirement – cf. expression (41) – the impact of increased productivity6
on steady-state capital is now strengthened in two respects. First, the ‘static reallocation eﬀect’ that raises7
the equilibrium wage now induces larger savings because higher wages also mean a higher anticipated cost of8
minimum care in the second period of life: the additional increase in savings is determined by the presence9
of m2 inside the last term of (42). Second, the ‘dynamic feedback eﬀects’ are stronger because rising wages10
during the transition prompt young agents to raise their savings further due, again, to the old-age requirement11
mechanism: this is why the savings multiplier, 1/ (1−m1 −m2), is larger than in the previous case with h¯ = 0.12
5.3. Reduced Fertility13
In the canonical model, a lower growth rate of population increases the steady-state level of capital per14
worker: from (36) it follows that15
d log κcanonicalss
−dn =
1
(1 + n) (1− α) > 0. (43)16
In contrast, from (39), the eﬀect of reduced fertility in our model is given by17
d log κ¯ss
−dn =
1
1−m1 −m2
[
d log κcanonicalss
−dn +
′n
(−′κ)κ¯ss
(m1 +m2) +

(1 + n) (−′κ)κ¯ss
m2
]
, (44)18
where the argument κ¯ss is suppressed to simplify the notation.
26 Expression (44) incorporates ﬁve eﬀects19
that do not arise in the canonical model. The ﬁrst two are included in the multiplier: as explained before,20
the term 1/ (1−m1 −m2) > 1 represents the positive feedbacks that capital growth exerts on itself due21
to the intergenerational distribution and the old-age requirement eﬀects. The second and third eﬀects are22
contained in the term
′n
(−′κ)κ¯ss (m1 +m2), which represents the change in the static equilibrium of the labor23
market: the reduction in fertility increases the fraction of old agents in total population, pushing workers out of24
generic production and into care services; the resulting wage increase raises the savings rate through both the25
intergenerational distribution and the old-age requirement eﬀects. The ﬁfth eﬀect is the last term appearing26
(44), which represents a dilution eﬀect: lower population growth increases labor scarcity even for a ﬁxed labor27
allocation. The implied rise in wages triggers further savings through the old-age requirement eﬀect.28
25Given σ < 1, both m1 and m2 are positive because ′κ < 0 – see expression (30) – and m1 +m2 is strictly less than unity in
view of the stability condition (37) proven in Proposition 4. Under substitutability, instead, expression (30) would imply ′κ > 0,
m1 +m2 < 0 and, hence, a multiplier below unity.
26In (44), the terms m1,m2, , ′n, ′κ are all evaluated in the steady state κ¯ss. Also, the derivation of (44) exploits the fact that
dΓ
dn
= −Γ′ h¯
(1+n)
from expression (26). See the online appendix for full derivations.
5.4. Increased need for care1
In the model, a higher h¯ represent an increased need to purchase care services through the market. Obvi-2
ously, this draws resources out of generic production and into the care sector. By (39), the eﬀect on steady-state3
capital is4
d log κ¯ss
dh¯
=
1
1−m1 −m2
[
′¯
h
′κ · κ¯ss
(m1 +m2)− 
h¯ · ′κκ¯ss
m2
]
. (45)5
Besides the now familiar savings multiplier, a higher minimum requirement induces two types of static eﬀects.6
First, there is a direct positive eﬀect on the cost of care, represented by the term − 
h¯′κκ¯ss
m2, which increases7
savings. Second, the static equilibrium of the labor market changes since higher demand for care pulls workers8
out of generic production and drives up the wage. This eﬀect, represented by the term
′¯
h
′κκ¯ss
(m1+m2), generates9
higher savings through both the intergenerational distribution and the old-age requirement eﬀects. With the10
additional stimulus of the savings multiplier, 1/ (1−m1 −m2), the increased need for market-provided care may11
thus have a strong positive impact on capital accumulation. This possibility is conﬁrmed by our quantitative12
analysis in section 6.13
6. Quantitative Analysis14
This section presents a quantitative assessment of the theoretical results taking China’s economy as empirical15
reference. The model parameters are calibrated to obtain steady-state values that match the most recent data,16
and the eﬀects of exogenous shocks are evaluated.17
6.1. Calibration18
The model is calibrated so as to match, in the steady state, four target values of the endogenous variables19
reported in the ﬁrst line of Table 1. The value θ = 0.28 reﬂects China’s saving rate (Prasad, 2015). Variable20
TES is the share of total expenditures devoted to care services, with target value 0.083 given by conservative21
projections based on Chamon and Prasad (2010).27 Variable CIS is the capital income share, with target22
value 0.46 given by one minus the long-run labor share in GDP net of production tax calculated by Bai23
and Qian (2010).28 The target value of the employment share of manufacturing relative to care services,24
1−
 = 0.19, corresponds to paid employment in “Health and Social Work” plus “Social and Personal Service25
Activities” divided by paid employment in “Manufacturing” in China (ILO, 2015: Table 2.E), and implies26
an employment share in the generic sector  = 0.84.29 Given these target values, the exogenous parameters27
27Chamon and Prasad (2010: Table A2, p.129) report the 1992-2004 time series of health versus non-health expenditures: the
implied TES goes from 2.5% in 1992 to 7.4% in 2004. More recent data on sectoral GDP shares show that, during the 2005-2014
decade, total spending in services went from from 42.9% to 48.2% of GDP (World Development Indicators, 2015). Under the
conservative hypothesis that, during the 2005-2014 decade, health expenditures grew at the same rate as total expenditures in
services, the implied ﬁgure for 2004 is TES = 8.3%.
28For the mathematical deﬁnitions of TES and CIS in our model see the online appendix.
29The ‘generic good’ sector of the model is here interpreted as a real-world sector that includes both ‘manufacturing’ and
‘services’ excluding ‘care services’. The reason is that our aim is to assess to what extent the intergenerational distribution and
the old-age requirement eﬀects inﬂuence long-run capital even though the care services sector is quantitatively small in terms of
both employment and expenditure shares.
are chosen as follows (cf. Table 1, second and third panels). The values of α and σ are given by empirical1
evidence: α = 0.5 is the baseline used in most calibrated models of China (e.g., Song et al. 2011), and σ = 0.22
is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and health care services estimated by Finkelstein et al.3
(2013). Next, parameters (η, h¯, n) are restricted by numerical combinations that yield a threshold employment4
share max = 0.9 that is consistent with the target value  = 0.84. The remaining parameters (β, γ,B) are5
then chosen so as to obtain, in the steady state equilibrium, the four target values of the endogenous variables6
discussed above. The actual steady state values are reported in the fourth panel of Table 1.7
The last panel in Table 1 evaluates the determinants of capital per worker according to the decomposition8
reported in equation (39): the steady-state stock κ¯ss is determined by the canonical component (κ
canonical
ss ), the9
intergenerational distribution eﬀect (IDE), and the old-age requirement (OAR).30 The numbers show that κ¯ss10
exceeds the canonical level by 34%, which is a noticeable quantitative result: despite the small size of the care11
sector, the existence of needs for old-age care ultimately raises the capital stock by one third relative to the12
canonical model’s baseline. The IDE and the OAR factors reported in Table 1 show that the intergenerational13
distribution eﬀect alone raises capital by 18% above the canonical level, and the old-age requirement eﬀect14
adds a further 13% gain. The product of IDE and OAR factors, 1.34, determines the overall distance between15
κ¯ss and the canonical level.16
6.2. Exogenous shocks and transitional dynamics17
The calibrated model can be used to evaluate the impact of exogenous events of diﬀerent nature. This18
subsection considers a negative requirement shock, represented by a decline in the value of h¯, and positive19
fertility shocks represented by exogenous increases in the value of n. Conceptually, the exercise is related to20
the important reforms recently announced by China’s government, namely, the introduction of welfare beneﬁts21
that will cover the minimum care services required by the old, and the abandonment of the one-child policy22
that will arguably raise China’s fertility rate in the future. In quantitative terms, the requirement shock is a23
decline of h¯ from the baseline value 1 to zero. Fertility shocks consist of two scenarios in which the population24
growth rate increases from the baseline value of zero to n = 0.133 and to n = 0.282: these numbers may be25
interpreted as permanent shocks raising the fertility rate by, respectively, 0.5% and 1% per annum (given an26
OLG model with 25 years per period).27
Table 2 reports the results obtained using the baseline simulation (i.e., the parameter values reported in28
Table 1) in the upper panel, as well as two robustness checks in which parameters are changed to allow for29
weaker complementarity (middle panel, with higher values of σ) and a higher output elasticity to capital (lower30
panel, with higher values of α). The impact of all the shocks on steady-state capital per worker is quite robust31
to such alternative parametrization. The requirement shock would reduce the long-run stock of capital per32
worker by 21%-24%. This eﬀect is quantitatively close to that of the permanent fertility shock n = 0.133,33
which would reduce κ¯ss by 25%-31% (the stronger fertility shock n = 0.282 would instead reduce κ¯ss by 43%-34
30From (39), the IDE factor equals 1/
α
1−α and the OAR factor is Γ
(
h¯/ss
) 1
1−α .
51%). The crucial diﬀerence between requirement and fertility shocks lies in the transmission channels. The1
elimination of the care requirement h¯ involves pure non-canonical mechanisms, with strong labor reallocation2
and sensible reductions in saving rates: in the baseline simulation, ss goes from 0.847 to 0.941 and θss drops3
from 28% to 25%. The fertility shock, instead, activates the canonical dilution eﬀect of population on capital4
per worker and, hence, generates modest variations in employment shares and in saving rates. The scope of5
the reallocation eﬀects arising after the shocks is further emphasized by the transitional dynamics depicted in6
Figure 3, which refer to the baseline simulation.7
7. Conclusion8
This paper introduced the concept of savings multiplier, a general equilibrium mechanism that induces9
rising saving rates over time and that magniﬁes the impact of exogenous shocks on capital per capita in the10
long run. In our theory, capital accumulation yields positive feedbacks on saving rates via two channels. First,11
real wages increase as the capital stock grows at the same time as workers move from the manufacturing12
sector to the labor-intensive service sector, implying a shift of the income distribution in favor of young savers13
(intergenerational distribution eﬀect). Second, growth in real wages raises the anticipated cost of providing14
for the old age, prompting the currently young to save a higher fraction current income (old-age requirement15
eﬀect). Both these mechanisms provide a novel explanation for rising saving rates in developing countries and,16
more speciﬁcally, are consistent with the stylized facts that characterize China’s economic performance.17
Our analysis of exogenous shocks suggests that China’s past reforms – in particular, the one-child policy18
and the dismantling of cradle-to-grave social beneﬁts – have fueled China’s saving rates in the past decades.19
Our quantitative analysis shows that capital in the long run may be quite sensitive to changes in the minimum20
care services required by old agents even though the care sector is small relative to manufacturing and other21
services. This suggests that the recently announced policy reforms, i.e., the abandonment of the one-child22
policy and the introduction of welfare beneﬁts, may reduce savings and long-run capital to a much larger23
extent than what the traditional neoclassical model would predict.24
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Tables1
Target values for endogenous variables (from data)
θ = 0.28 TES = 0.083 CIS = 0.46 1− = 0.19
Parameter values (from empirical evidence)
α = 0.5 σ = 0.2
Parameter values (free)
n = 0 h¯ = 1 η = 10
B = 1.628 β = 0.95 γ = 0.5
Simulations results: targeted steady state values
θss = 0.281 TESss = 0.083 CISss = 0.468
1−ss
ss
= 0.182
Simulations results: sectoral labor
ss = 0.846 
max = 0.90
Simulations results: capital per worker
κ¯ss = 0.210
κcanonicalss = 0.157 IDE = 1.181 OAR = 1.133
Caption Table 1:2
Table 1. Baseline calibration, parameter values and steady state results (see the procedure described in3
subsection 6.1. for details).4
Baseline simulation n h¯ σ α ss θss κ¯ss (change)
Before shock 0.000 1 0.2 0.5 0.847 0.281 0.210
Requirement shock 0.000 0 0.2 0.5 0.941 0.251 0.167 (-21%)
Fertility shock (0.5% p.a.) 0.133 1 0.2 0.5 0.862 0.276 0.158 (-25%)
Fertility shock (1% p.a.) 0.282 1 0.2 0.5 0.876 0.272 0.120 (-43%)
Robustness (higher σ) n h¯ σ α ss θss κ¯ss (change)
Before shock 0.000 1 0.5 0.5 0.782 0.293 0.230
Requirement shock 0.000 0 0.5 0.5 0.860 0.262 0.183 (-21%)
Fertility shock (0.5% p.a.) 0.133 1 0.5 0.5 0.796 0.288 0.173 (-25%)
Fertility shock (1% p.a.) 0.282 1 0.5 0.5 0.810 0.283 0.131 (-43%)
Robustness (higher α) n h¯ σ α ss θss κ¯ss (change)
Before shock 0.000 1 0.5 0.6 0.786 0.234 0.071
Requirement shock 0.000 0 0.5 0.6 0.875 0.211 0.054 (-24%)
Fertility shock (0.5% p.a.) 0.133 1 0.5 0.6 0.805 0.229 0.050 (-31%)
Fertility shock (1% p.a.) 0.282 1 0.5 0.6 0.823 0.225 0.035 (-51%)
Caption Table 2:1
Table 2. Impact of exogenous variations in h¯ or n on capital per worker (see subsection 6.2. for details). In2
the upper panel, the row ‘Before shock’ reports results obtained in the baseline calibration described in Table 1.3
The middle and lower panels perform the same exercise under stronger complementarity in preferences (higher4
σ) and higher elasticity to capital (higher α), respectively.5
Figures Captions1
Caption Figure 1: Graph (a): saving and investment shares of GDP in China 1970-2010 (source: World2
Bank). Graph (b): paid employment in Health and Social Work relative to paid employment in Manufacturing3
in China 1993-2008 (source: authors calculations on LABORSTA Table 2E, International Labor Organization).4
Caption Figure 2: Static equilibrium: determination of t and pt for given κt. The case of strong5
substitution (σ > 2) implies local concavity of Ψ () for low  without altering existence, uniqueness, and6
comparative-statics properties.7
Caption Figure 3: Transitional dynamics induced by fertility and requirement shocks in the baseline8
simulation (see Section 6. for details). The ‘benchmark’ paths represent steady state values before the shocks.9



